

Plan Melbourne: A Critique and a Review of Its Implications for Housing

Richard Tomlinson

rht@unimelb.edu.au

Presented at the State of Australian Cities conference, 27-29 November 2013

Plan Melbourne, the State of Victoria's metropolitan planning strategy for the citizens of metropolitan Melbourne and its 31 local governments, was released for comment in October 2013. This 'evidence-based strategy'¹ for the next 37 years 'consider[s] where new housing and business activities should be concentrated as well as transport connections, health services, schools, sports grounds and parks' (DPCD 2013a²). The intended detail is evident in the Department of Transport, Planning and Local Government (DTPLG) proposing to develop guidelines for neighbourhood village cafes (p. 101).

The focus of this paper is on the politics and significance of *Plan Melbourne*, with significance being most closely assessed in terms of the Plan's ability to influence housing outcomes. The paper proceeds from my housing and governance research that led to *Australia's Unintended Cities* (Tomlinson 2012). Further to that research, the paper is based on reviewing submissions to the Ministerial Advisory Committee that in 2012 released *Melbourne, let's talk about the future. Discussion Paper*, following the substantial trail of government documents and Web information and social media discussion, discussion with participants and commentators on the planning process and the *Discussion Paper*, and limited participation in the process.

The paper has four sections. The first makes the points that to a considerable degree *Plan Melbourne* is a compilation of strategic decisions already made rather than the outcome of a metropolitan strategic planning process. It is also noted that none of these decisions are accountable to Melbourne's metropolitan population. The second summarises the transition from *Melbourne 2030* to *Plan Melbourne* and the associated housing policies and trends. The third concerns what is required for a strategic plan to be meaningful and how *Plan Melbourne* "measures up". The final section considers whether the participation process has created community "buy-in" of the intended type, location and cost (TLC) of housing. The conclusion is that *Plan Melbourne* and its implications for housing are best

¹ These are the words used by then Premier Ted Baillieu when initiating the Community Forum on the development of the Metropolitan Planning Strategy, 2 March 2013. Aside from a long-term vision necessary for investment in city-shaping infrastructure, the notion that one can and should plan for 37 years hence is remarkable. Thirty years ago the concern of the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works was Melbourne becoming a 'doughnut city' (Howe 2009). Having experienced the growth of professional services in the inner city and an inner city residential and tourism boom, reality contradicts the evidence-base at the time.

² The quote is from the DPCD's website and there is no page number. <http://www.dpcd.vic.gov.au/planning/plansandpolicies/planningformelbourne> (Accessed 10 April 2013)

understood by two words not included in the plan: 'politics' and 'profit'. *Plan Melbourne* does not measure up.

The terrain of metropolitan strategic planning

In my view the strategic planning process for metropolitan Melbourne is flawed due to the governance context for planning. This is because, for example:

- The politics of the State require that the ruling party serve particular constituencies in the metropolitan area in order to win the next State elections. The ruling party cannot adopt a metropolitan perspective and there is no accountability to a metropolitan vote.
- Economic strategies and infrastructure investment and the associated implications for urban structure are central to a strategic plan, but the major metropolitan decisions have already been made in the form of *Securing Victoria's Economy: Planning. Building. Delivering* and the East West Link connecting the Eastern Freeway and Western Ring Road that is contained in *Building for Growth. 2013-14 Victorian Budget. Infrastructure Investment*.
- Housing density, and the location thereof, *also are central to a strategic plan, but the State's Amendment V8, Reformed Residential Zones*, to the Victoria Planning Provisions, introduced in July 2013, creates residential zones *that are intended to 'assist in identifying appropriate areas where urban densification will occur'*³, that is, to influence Melbourne's urban form prior to the completion of *Plan Melbourne*.
- The vision for brownfield sites, most notably Fishermans Bend, reportedly Australia's largest urban renewal site, is the intended location for '25,000 jobs and 50,000 residents'⁴. The vision was announced in July 2012.
- State governments depend on the Commonwealth government to fund large infrastructure projects (Silver 2010), but Commonwealth governments change and so too do Commonwealth infrastructure funding priorities⁵. The result is that State governments prepare metropolitan infrastructure grant applications in competition with one another and with an eye on Commonwealth infrastructure funding priorities (Tomlinson 2012).
- State government public participation processes may either be disregarded, as occurred for *Melbourne 2030* (Mees 2011), or represent a closely choreographed activity whose contribution to *Plan Melbourne* is heralded, but not demonstrated (see below).

In effect, when it comes to formulating, funding and implementing *Plan Melbourne*, the State government serves, or seeks support from, multiple constituencies and agencies, none

³ [Fact sheet - Reformed residential zones, July 2013](#) (accessed 18 March 2013)

⁴

<http://www.fishermansbend.vic.gov.au/cs/Satellite?c=VArticle&cid=1339118142673&pagename=Places%2FLayout> (accessed 29 October 2013)

⁵ The first transport infrastructure grant announced by the LABOR PARTY Victoria State government in 2008 was a public transport rail project, the Regional Rail Link. This was the first public transport infrastructure grant by the Commonwealth government and a symbolic statement of change.

of which can be assumed to be guided by a metropolitan perspective. To a significant degree, *Plan Melbourne* represents a compilation of strategic decisions already made. Reflecting the dearth of issues still available to *Plan Melbourne*, Premier Napthine directs us to Plan Melbourne's 'core' issues: the creation of a 20-minute city and a polycentric city (DTPLG 2013, p. i). Climate change is not identified as a core issue.

In the light of these criticism, why proceed? Three reasons are relevant to this paper. First, strategic plans are obligatory. Then Prime Minister Rudd (2009) said that 'If the Commonwealth is to foot any significant part of the urban infrastructure bill – the Commonwealth will legitimately expect to have confidence in the integrity of the strategic planning system in our major cities'⁶. Second, strategic plans affect the availability of land and the TLC of new housing, albeit with unintended outcomes (Birrell et al. 2012). Third, *Plan Melbourne* introduces a Metropolitan Planning Authority (MPA) whose role concerns responsibility for planning for sites viewed as having metropolitan significance, coordinating local government land use planning and driving implementation. *Plan Melbourne* warrants attention.

From Melbourne 2030 to Plan Melbourne

Plan Melbourne will be the sixth metropolitan strategic plan since the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works 1953 strategic plan. In this century it follows the Labor Party's *Melbourne 2030* (released in 2001) and *Melbourne @ 5 million* (released in 2008). Tracing the shift from *Melbourne 2030* to *Plan Melbourne* contextualizes *Plan Melbourne* and describes both housing policies and trends.

Melbourne 2030

Following Mees (2003, 2011), the origins of *Melbourne 2030* lie in the Labor Party winning the Victoria State elections in 1999. The Labor Party promised that the preparation of, 'Metropolitan and regional development strategies will be prepared and integrated with a whole of government approach to planning. Land use planning will be tied to transport, environmental, social and economic planning' (cited in Mees, 2003, p. 288). The preparation of *Melbourne 2030* took three years. Despite a three-stage participatory process⁷, none of the comments and views of those who participated were taken into

⁶ Notionally, the Commonwealth government will fund infrastructure projects recommended by Infrastructure Australia according to the 'business case' of the projects. This is not how matters proceed. For example, Infrastructure Australia (2012) prioritized a Metro rail tunnel for Melbourne based on its 'business case' and the project was placed in its top 'Priority List' (p. 97). Instead of applying for funding for this public transport project, the Coalition State Government has applied for the East-West Link. Although the Ring Road lacks a 'business case', 'with a benefit-to-cost ratio of 0.5' (Sturup and Low 2013), the East-West link is supported by Tony Abbott. Why would a Coalition State government submit a Metro rail funding application to a Commonwealth government that, under Abbott, seeks not to fund rail projects (Davies 2013)? 'There remains, despite Rudd's best intentions, ... no organising principle for how to co-ordinate investment in Australian cities among different spheres of government' (Saulwick 2011).

⁷ 'All Ears Listening', 'Did we hear you right?', 'Reviewing 'Our' Draft Strategy'.

account. The reports of consultants were similarly disregarded. Officials in the Department of Infrastructure, whose Coalition lineage harked back to the promotion of suburban freeways, reportedly disregarded technical reports, participation and community inputs. Thus, 'The Melbourne 2030 strategic plan used the rhetoric of urban consolidation and transit-oriented development but expansion of the freeway network was the primary infrastructure focus of the plan; ...' (Stone 2009, p. 427).

Nominally *Melbourne 2030* supported a more compact city, the extension of the public transport system, greater density through imposing an Urban Growth Boundary and increasing the proportion of new housing constructed in existing areas, especially along public transport routes and in activity centres. 'The Melbourne 2030 goals which affect the characteristics of housing supply ... include the goals of increasing residential densities; improving housing choice and affordability by providing a greater mix of housing types and sizes; and locating a greater proportion of housing closer to jobs, activity centres and public transport' (Goodman et al. 2010, p. 2). Since the launch of *Melbourne 2030* there 'has been an increase in housing density, it has mainly been in the form of *ad hoc* infill rather than in medium-to-high-density apartment blocks in activity centres' (Birrell et al. 2012, p. 2). The increase in housing in inner and middle ring suburbs cannot be attributed to *Melbourne 2030*. In turn the Urban Growth Boundary did not cause a redistribution of new housing in favour of existing urban areas. The Boundary was extended three times and a fourth time with the advent of *Melbourne @ 5 million*.⁸ Approximately 50% of new housing is located in the outer suburbs (Birrell et al. 2012). Melbourne has not grown according to plan. '*Melbourne 2030* and its successors have made little impression on the basic structure of the metropolis, both in terms economic bifurcation and its spread and density' (Spiller 2012, p. 10).

Melbourne @ 5 million

Melbourne @ 5 million was presented as an update responding to revised population projects and the need for about 600,000 more houses than anticipated in *Melbourne 2030*, and also as a response to the 2008 *Victorian Transport Plan*. *Melbourne @ 5 million* represents a substantial change in that activity centres are viewed as the site of services relevant to neighbourhood development and still hoped for increasing housing density at transport nodes rather than as the building blocks of metropolitan strategy. Instead, the focus turns to six Central Activities Districts and jobs and services along employment and transport corridors ('a freeway, a rail line and a suburban bus route' (Mees 2011, p. 6), and higher housing densities and employment especially along tram routes. Underlying these changes is the goal of creating a multi-centre or polycentric city, which is not mentioned in *Melbourne 2030*.

⁸ I was informed within government the boundary is no longer viewed as a constraint to develop Melbourne and a relevant instrument of public policy.

The election of the Liberal Coalition government in 2010 government provides too little time for an assessment of the effectiveness of *Melbourne @ 5 million*. However, the focus on Central Activities Districts and a polycentric city are carried through to *Plan Melbourne*.

Plan Melbourne

With some hyperbole, the Liberal Coalition's election manifesto rejected *Melbourne 2030*. Another strategic plan was on the way. What could not have been expected is a plan with a 37 year planning horizon. Aside from a long-term vision necessary for investment in city-shaping infrastructure, the notion that one can and should plan for 37 years hence is remarkable. Thirty years ago the concern of the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works was Melbourne becoming a 'doughnut city' (Howe 2009). Having experienced the growth of professional services in the inner city and an inner city residential and tourism boom, reality contradicts the evidence-base at the time. Nowadays, in the midst of climate change, technological innovation, economic uncertainties, demographic trends, and so on, the notion of a 37 year 'evidence-based' strategy lacks credibility. In times that are so 'unusually uncertain', the unforeseen is certain and the expected unlikely. Proceeding nonetheless, ...

As noted, *Plan Melbourne* focuses on building a polycentric city and a 20-minute city. A polycentric city is viewed as necessary to enhance Melbourne's global competitiveness and is based on places and jobs: the central city, existing employment and innovation clusters (e.g. Monash-Clayton), facilities and employment generators (e.g. Tullamarine airport), and freight and logistics routes and terminals. The rationale for the polycentric city comprises the perceived contribution to economic competitiveness arising from investing, through infrastructure improvements, where people work rather than where they live. Finances for the infrastructure improvements are not identified.

However, this is not to disregard neighbourhoods and 'activity centres'. The slogans, for want of a better way of expressing it, are 'living locally' and the creation of a '20 minute city'. 'Living locally', is defined through reference to a healthy, safe and attractive lifestyle and the building of an inclusive city. Were such circumstances possible, the rationale for a 20 minute city is self-evident. The implementation and funding features of the 20-minute city comprise services that are publicly provided, for example, schools, and hoped for decisions in the market for the location of jobs and the TLC of housing.

McCloskey et al. (2009) and Birrell et al. (2012) question the assumptions underlying increasing housing densities at activity centres. Increasing residential densities where public transport is available is of little value if the employment destination is not on public transport routes, or requires multiple changes en route. Since most jobs in Melbourne have these destination characteristics, a car will remain the preferred means of getting to work.

For a strategic plan to be meaningful

In anticipation of *Melbourne 2030*, Yencken (2001, emphasis added) listed what is required for a metropolitan strategic plan to be meaningful. While the list was prepared with Melbourne in mind, it is held that it has application throughout Australia. He writes that a plan must have:

1. 'a reasonable life span to have a chance of achieving its goals and, while requiring constant review and refinement, [it] should not be drastically chopped and changed every time there is a change in the political cycle' (p. 247);
2. 'strong political backing' 'to 'insure the active commitment and involvement of many departments and agencies' (p. 245);
3. 'strong community backing' since it is 'Only through full community participation and a general satisfaction that the strategy has attempted to deal with issues of basic concern to citizens can the strategy hope to have a life beyond that of the government which has brought it into being' (p. 248); and
4. be 'largely depoliticised ... by being prepared by an agency of government which has a significant degree of independence' (p. 247).

Yencken adds that a strategy 'worth its salt' (p. 250) needs to systematically examine how best it might address climate change and waste management.

How does *Plan Melbourne* measure up?

1. Planning is political and planning in Melbourne is exceedingly so. (See 4. below.) Spiller (2012) despairs that the politicisation of strategic plans will inevitably lead to a change in government preparing a new strategic plan.
2. A comment regarding political backing would, at this stage, be premature.
3. The DTPLG emphasises the extent of community consultation⁹. Consultation metrics do not reflect consultation content. For example, Save Our Suburbs (2013) commented that it 'believes that the ... public consultation process has been ineffective in educating the community about the planning issues facing Melbourne well enough to enable them to suggest logical and realistic solutions (as opposed to merely being able to comment on the predetermined options presented to them in the draft MPS)' ... and the 'SOS is highly critical of the public consultation process'.
4. Plan Melbourne was prepared within government, with the Minister responsible given to politicizing issues and seeking to prevent debate. Matthew Guy has established a reputation for wanting to 'shut down meaningful engagement with planners in this state', with an example provided being his response to an article in *The Age* (15 July 2012) by Michael Buxton, 'Planning for Disaster'. The Minister tweeted: 'Another day, another article by Socialist opposition planning spokesman Michael Buxton. Doing

⁹ The extent of consultation was especially emphasized at the DTPLG Plan Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Strategy Forum on 24 October 2013.

Soviet planners proud'. *Plan Melbourne* was finalized in a highly charged political environment, which is evident in 'New laws to silence road project critics' (Gordon 2013a) and 'Yarra council accuses state of trying to gag link criticism' (Cook 2013).

As regards the 'worth its salt' criterion, it appears that the primary means through which *Plan Melbourne* seeks to address climate change is through aligning jobs, housing and public transport (p. 121). To comment further is to risk the focus of this paper, but arguably since *Plan Melbourne* does not address climate change as a core issue its longevity is compromised.

Set against Yencken's criteria, *Plan Melbourne* fares poorly. The significance of *Plan Melbourne* is further compromised by the neo-liberal environment within which planning occurs. Commenting on the *Melbourne 2030* strategy of a Labor Party government, Kroen and Goodman (2012, p. 312) observe that due to the government's neo-liberal approach to intervention, 'much of the strategy's intentions were simply ignored by the development industry'. Should one expect that housing trends will proceed according to plan under *Plan Melbourne*, that is, under the State's Amendment V8, *Reformed Residential Zones*? Buxton (2013) comments that

The Victorian government has radically deregulated its land use planning system, giving unprecedented power to developers to determine the shape and function of our city. ... Having largely given planning away to private interests, the government is not going to take it back through a powerful metropolitan plan.

One has to concede that in a context where Premier Napthine seeks an "'open for business" culture with fewer bureaucratic bottlenecks' (Gordon 2013b), it cannot be expected that the State government will actively seek to steer the TLC of housing.

Plan Melbourne and housing

From the point of view of the TLC of housing, is it likely that the public participation process underlying *Plan Melbourne* has created "buy-in" to the intended future TLC of housing, is it likely that the MPA will enable coordinated investment in housing, services and private sector employment and, more generally, should one anticipate that *Plan Melbourne* has the capacity to affect housing trends?

Participation and "buy-in"

The TLC of housing is a defining planning issue in Melbourne and housing affordability was emphasised during the Ministerial Advisory Committee participation process. The TLC of housing has a rich history of local opposition (Lewis 1999, Davison 2004). One might expect that the participation process would consult community organisations in this regard. As emphasised by the Grattan Institute (Kelly 2010), rather than have objections and long

delays to proposed housing projects, let the vigorous debate occur when the strategic plan is being prepared and build general acceptance of where increased densities should occur and the type of housing and economic activities that should be encouraged. The submission of planning activist Liz Burton is indicative of the failure to obtain buy-in and, perhaps also, understanding: The '20 minute city ... is code for high population density ... and should be withdrawn'.¹⁰

There were some discussions with community organizations after the release of the *Discussion Paper*; in effect, community organisations were not meaningfully consulted during the planning process. As noted, Save Our Suburbs strongly condemned the process and, in its submission the Boroondara Residents' Action Group (2013) decided not to follow 'the suggested response questions', complaining of 'predetermined options'. The perception of an orchestrated participation process is illustrated by a 'forum' I attended¹¹.

This perception of a failure of consultation is perhaps an inevitable consequence of how the strategic planning process is perceived by the Commonwealth and Victoria State governments. In order to give effect to Prime Minister Rudd 's making infrastructure finance dependent on strategic plans and good governance, the COAG Reform Council was charged with preparing nine criteria for *Capital city strategic planning systems*. This was published in 2012. The only reference to participation in the criteria involves:

9. d) appropriate consultation and engagement with external stakeholders, experts and the wider community.

Through COAG, the Commonwealth government suggests pro forma participation and, certainly, the State government did not seek to create a stage for vigorous debate.

Metropolitan Planning Authority

In regard to the MPA, it will not have the authority to itself undertake planning. The MPA will also not have the authority to raise revenue for infrastructure projects. In regard to the metropolitan region, its job is to coordinate local government planning and to facilitate the

¹⁰ <http://candobetter.net/?q=node/3280> (Accessed 30 May 2013)

¹¹ The purpose of the 'Community Event Roundup', 2 March 2013, 'was to debate some of the challenges that face Melbourne as a growing and changing city and to share ideas that could help Melbourne remain the most liveable [city] in the world'. (<http://www.planmelbourne.vic.gov.au/about/news-and-events/community-event-round-up> Accessed 29 May 2013) The Forum Workbook provided to all participants summarized the *Discussion Paper*. Most of the day was devoted to addresses by politicians and those involved in preparing the strategy. Discussion among persons sitting at each table occurred for about two hours. The participants were provided with the questions to address. A rapporteur at each table noted our differing positions. At the conclusion we were asked to vote on a number of questions or statements through pressing a number on a remote, for example: 'In 25 years I'll be able to recommend Melbourne to others as a great place to live and work'. Aside from questions addressed to speakers on their specific topics, at no stage were the items for discussion not predetermined.

implementation of *Plan Melbourne*. The MPA's powers and functions appear to be modeled on the Growth Areas Authority, which facilitated development on Melbourne's periphery, and the head of the MPA is the former head of the Authority. The Property Council of Australia (2013) supported the creation of a MPA and proposed a partnership with the private sector in the governance structure of the MPA. It recommended that 'The top priority of a new metropolitan authority should be to help facilitate development on zoned and serviced land for housing, employment (commercial, industrial and retail uses) and other community activities in an effective and timely manner' (p. 4). While being somewhat cynical about the MPA, its role and the possibility of bias in favour of property developers, to actually make these claims would be a rush to judgement.

Plan Melbourne and the TLC of housing

Plan Melbourne repeats the objective of seeking to provide affordable housing across a range of housing types and locations. The ability of State strategic is questioned in *Australia's Unintended Cities* (Tomlinson 2012). The thrust of the book is that urban outcomes, housing outcomes in particular, are being shaped by the unintended consequences of a variety of Commonwealth and State policies, programs and governance structures that were not intended to have such outcomes, and that these have a considerably greater impact than a metropolitan strategic plan.

For example, following Yates (2012), the housing market is distorted by exempting owner-occupied housing from capital gains and by negative gearing. These incentives have resulted in most new home loans going to homeowners to upgrade their properties or purchase investor housing. Yates continues that benefitting from an assumed ongoing increase in housing prices and, in the absence of capital gains taxes, many older homeowners consume housing above a level they need or want. To this should be added the Stamp Duty that generates 'sticky trade down behaviour'. In all, the effect is to increase housing prices and the search for cheap housing leads to ever more peripheral development. Affordability constraints in the housing market, including therein constraints on the urban fringe where the majority of buyers are second- or third generation homebuyers (Birrell 2012), are leading to a profound realignment (Randolph 2006) as young households move away from the supposed Australian dream of homeownership towards the 'foreign housing product' (Property Council 2013, p. 31), the rental market and living in apartments. In effect, while the TLC of housing is central to strategic plans, the context is one where Federal and State tax and other policies create a contradictory unintended incentive framework for both households and property developers.

This said, while clearly less influential, a metropolitan strategic plan can seek to influence the TLC of housing. In the past there was much ado about urban growth boundaries, but the land available for housing development is now so extensive that land availability in

Melbourne is not an issue.¹² The issues that do exist were decided before the finalization of *Plan Melbourne* and include the *Reformed Residential Zones*, the East West Link and the development of Fishermans Bend. Each issue warrants its own paper, but based on the housing projections contained in *Plan Melbourne* (p. 51 on), it is no doubt correct to say the anticipated increase in demand for housing is such that these issues will have little effect on the affordability of housing in Melbourne.

Conclusion

Plan Melbourne is best understood through reference to ‘politics’ and ‘profit’.

In the case of politics, *Plan Melbourne* is not accountable to a metropolitan electorate. Perhaps excluding a part of metropolitan Brisbane, every metropolitan strategic plan in Australia is guided by the interests of State government in being elected or re-elected. Ultimately, one can only speculate regarding what a metropolitan strategic plan that is prepared by a representative body would contain.

In the case of profits, both the Labor Party and the Liberal Coalition adopt a neo-liberal frame of reference and seemingly are confident that market-led urban development will provide the ‘cities Australians want’ (Productivity Commission 2011, Vol. 1, p. XIX). It is arguable that ordinarily the contest between metropolitan strategic visions concerns the planning and regulatory environment and the means through which infrastructure is financed; essentially which voting constituencies and which lobbying groups benefit. This provides the context for Buxton claiming that *Plan Melbourne* is a ‘hoax’, one which serves private interests. At present, however, more is at stake. The Labor Party would prioritise public above private transport and, to an uncertain degree, seek to build a city less given to carbon emissions.

Melbourne’s metropolitan region is perhaps better viewed as a stage for party politics and the pursuit of profit than a metropolis in need of profound restructuring with a view to addressing climate change, increasing social, spatial and economic inequality, and threats to the city’s productivity.

¹² This comment is based on an anonymous source in government and discussions with a prominent property developer.

References

- Birrell, B., E. Healy, V. Rapson and T.F. Smith. 2012. *The End of Affordable Housing in Melbourne?* Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University.
<http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDQQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fartsonline.monash.edu.au%2Fpur%2Ffiles%2F2012%2F07%2Fend-of-affordable-housing-in-melbourne.pdf&ei=BbGVUYHNPLANMELBOURNEKgQXiu4HYCw&usg=AFQjCNEVXkpoWrkbkft0UN2gVKAmBhmTjw&bvm=bv.46471029,d.dGI> (Accessed 31 May 2013).
- Boroondara Residents' Action Group. 2013. BRAG's brilliant submission to Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Strategy. <http://candobetter.net/?q=node/3215> (Accessed 8 August 2103).
- Buxton, M. 2013. 'This is not a plan. It is a hoax driven by money', *The Age*, 10 October. <http://www.theage.com.au/comment/this-is-not-a-plan-it-is-a-hoax-driven-by-money-20131009-2v8hi.html> (accessed 30 October 2013)
- COAG Reform Council. 2012. *Review of capital city strategic planning systems*, COAG Reform Council, Sydney.
- Cook H. 2013. 'Yarra council accuses state of trying to gag link criticism', *The Age*, 8 August <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/yarra-council-accuses-state-of-trying-to-gag-link-criticism-20130807-2rgul.html#ixzz2bM6tohOz>
- Davies A. 2013. 'What's your problem with public transport, Mister Abbott?' *Crikey*, 7 April. <http://blogs.crikey.com.au/theurbanist/2013/04/07/whats-your-problem-with-public-transport-mister-abbott/> (accessed 10 April 2013)
- Davison G. 2004. *Car Wars: How the Car Won Our Hearts and Conquered Our Cities*, Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin.
- DPCD (Department of Planning and Community Development). 2013. *Plan Melbourne: A New Metropolitan Planning Strategy*.
- Goodman R., M. Buxton, P. Chhetri, E. Taylor and G. (2010) *Planning and the characteristics of housing supply in Melbourne*, AHURI Final Report No. 157.
- Gordon J. 2013a. 'New laws to silence road project critics' *The Age*, 5 August. <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/new-laws-to-silence-road-project-critics-20130804-2r7pn.html> (accessed 20 August 2013).
- Gordon J. 2013b. 'Departments get shake-up from Premier', *The Age*. April 10. <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/departments-get-shakeup-from-premier-20130409-2hjhv.html> (accessed 10 April 2013)
- Government of Victoria. 2013a. *Building for Growth*. 2013-14 Victorian Budget, Infrastructure Investment, Budget Information Paper No. 2. Melbourne
- Government of Victoria 2013b. *Securing Victoria's Economy: Planning. Building. Delivering*. Melbourne.
- Government of Victoria 2013c. *Reformed zones for Victoria*. Melbourne.
- Howe R. 2009. 'New Residents—New City. The Role of Urban Activists in the Transformation of Inner City Melbourne', *Urban Policy and Research*, 27, 3, 243-251

- Infrastructure Australia. 2012. *Australian Infrastructure. Progress and Action: Report to the Council of Australian Governments*, Government of Australia.
- Kelly, J-F. 2010. *Cities: Who Decides?* Melbourne, Grattan Institute
- Kroen A. and R. Goodman. 2012. 'Implementing metropolitan strategies: Lessons from Melbourne', *International Planning Studies*, 17, 3, 303-321.
- Lewis M. 1999. *Suburban backlash: the battle for the world's most liveable city*. Melbourne: Bloomings Books.
- Liberal Victoria. 2010. *The Victorian Liberal Nationals Coalition Plan for Planning*. Melbourne.
- McCloskey D., B. Birrell and R. Yip. 2009. 'Making public transport work in Melbourne', *People and Place*, 17, 3, 49-59.
- Mees P. 2003. 'Paterson's Curse: the Attempt to Revive Metropolitan Planning in Melbourne', *Urban Policy and Research*, 21, 3, 287-299.
- Mees P. 2011. 'Who killed Melbourne 2030?', Paper presented at the State of Australian Cities Conference, 29 November – 2 December.
(Accessed 31 May 2013).
- Productivity Commission (2011) *Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Planning, Zoning and Development Melbourne Assessment*. Research report. Canberra.
- Randolph B, 2006. 'Delivering the Compact City in Australia: Current Trends and Future Implications', *Urban Policy and Research*, 24, 4, 473-490
- Rudd K. 2009. 'Building A Big Australia: Future Planning Needs Of Our Major Cities', Prime Minister's Address To The Business Council Of Australia Sofitel Wentworth, Sydney.
http://www.minister.infrastructure.gov.au/aa/speeches/2009/AS21_2009.aspx
(accessed 16 April 2009)
- Saulwick J. 2011. 'A lament for Rudd's cities policy', *The Age*, January 15
<http://www.theage.com.au/business/a-lament-for-rudds-cities-policy-20110114-19rdw.html> (accessed 15 April 2013)
- [Save Our Suburbs Inc. Vic. Aust.](#) 2013. 'Comment on the draft Metropolitan Planning Strategy for Melbourne', March.
- Silver H. 2010. 'Getting the best out of federalism – the role of the Productivity Commission and the limits of national approaches', *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 69, 3, 326-332.
- Spiller M. 2012. 'Social justice and the centralization of governance in the Australian metropolis: a case study of Melbourne', Paper presented at the Second ISA Forum of Sociology – Social Justice and Democratization, Buenos Aires, 1-4 August.
- Stone J. 2009. 'Contrasts in reform: how the Cain and Burke years shaped public transport in Melbourne and Perth', *Urban Policy and Research*, 27, 4, 419-434.
- Sturup S. and N. Low. 2013. 'East-west tunnel plan looms as a road to ruin', *The Age*, 15 May.
<http://www.theage.com.au/comment/eastwest-tunnel-plan-looms-as-a-road-to-ruin-20130514-2jk5n.html> (accessed 15 May 2013).

- Tomlinson, R. 2012. 'Introduction: A housing lens on Australia's unintended cities', in R. Tomlinson (editor) *A Housing Lens on Australia's Unintended Cities*, CSIRO Publishing, 1-18.
- Yencken D. 2001. 'Scoping a metropolitan strategy', *Urban Policy and Research*, 19, 2, 243-250.